Abstract-The rapid growth of networking and communication technologies results in amalgamation of 'Internet of Things' and 'Wireless sensor networks' to form WSNIT. WSNIT facilitates the WSN to connect dynamically to Internet and exchange the data with the external world. The critical data stored in sensor nodes related to patient health, environment can be accessed by attackers via insecure internet. To counterattack this, there is a demand for data integrity and controlled data access by incorporating a highly secure and light weight authentication schemes. In this context, Santanu et al had proposed an attribute based authentication framework for WSN and discussed on its security strengths. In this paper, we do a thorough analysis on Santanu et al scheme; to show that their scheme is susceptible to privileged insider attack and node capture attack. We also demonstrate that Santanu et al scheme consists of major inconsistencies which restrict the protocol execution.
INTRODUCTION
The advances in internet technologies resulted in a dynamic internet called "Internet of Things" which can be labelled as a worldwide interconnection of distinctively addressable objects like RFID tags, sensors, Owens etc. The amalgamation of WSN and IoT allows mutual communication between external world and WSN by exchanging the information (patient health readings, environment data etc) sensed by sensors via Internet. However, accessing the sensor node via Internet raises security challenges, which need to be addressed to gain the advantage of the various benefits of such combination.
To achieve the data integrity and controlled access to sensor data, there is a demand for secure authentication schemes to allow only the legitimate user having specified access attributes to connect to the WSN. Due to the resource constrained nature of sensor nodes, the authentication scheme should not result in execution of heavy weight cryptographic operations like encryption, decryption etc. by the sensor nodes.
Various researchers had proposed protocols for secure authentication of users connecting to WSN [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] based on various techniques like password based [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , Temporal Credential based [1] , biometric based [1, 7] , chinese remainder theorem based [3, 4] , identity based [5] , bilinear pairing [6] , ECC based [5, 6, 9, 10] , chaotic map based [8] , attribute based [10, 11, 12] etc.,. Unfortunately, most of the protocols are analyzed insecure shortly, after they were put forward [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8] .
In 2015, Santanu et al. [10] proposed an ECC-based user access control scheme with attribute-based encryption for WSN and claimed that their protocol achieves stronger security by resisting major cryptographic attacks. In this paper we will show that Santanu et al. scheme is completely vulnerable to privileged insider attack which leads to leakage of user password to an insider, vulnerable to node capture attack, which leads to leakage of user identity to an attacker. Also Santanu et al scheme requires huge data storage and computation cost for generating user smart card. We will also show that, Santanu et al scheme consists of many inconsistencies or anomalies in various phases of their protocol execution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, a brief review of Santanu et al. scheme is given. Section III, describes the security weakness of Santanu et al. scheme. In section IV, we discuss various inconsistencies of Santanu et al. scheme, section V provides the conclusion of the paper.
II. REVIEW OF SANTANU ET AL SCHEME
In this section, we examine an effective ECC-based user access control scheme with attribute based encryption for WSN by Santanu et al [10] in 2015. The notations used in Santanu et al. [10] {RPWi, IDi} Receive at time TSUi Choose 'yi' specific to Ui Compute: Ai = h(IDi||TSUi) Ri = h(RPWi||Ai) Ui public key Yi = yi.G Selects an access structure Pi for each user Ui. For each node 'x' in Pi, the B.S needs to construct a dx+1 degree polynomial qx applying the Lagrange interpolation, where dx is the degree of the node 'x'. The BS then selects 'm' deployed cluster heads in the network CH1,CH2, .. CHm, Computes: m key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u <= m}, where Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)). 
, qr (0) = y and qx
A. Pre Deployment Phase
The base station (BS) performs the following steps in offline mode before the actual deployment of the sensor nodes and cluster heads in deployment field.
Step 1. B.S selects a large odd prime number 'p' of minimum 160 bits, generates a Galois Field G.F (p) and elliptic curve Ep(a,b), which is a set of all points on the curve y 2 = x 3 +ax+b (mod p), such that a,b ε Zp = {0,1,2,3....p-1}, satisfying the condition 4a 3 + 27b 2 ≠ 0. 'G' represents the base point of elliptic curve 'E' of order 'n', which is of 160 bits such that n>√p. B.S chooses a random number 'x' as its secret private key, computes its public key = X = x.G.
Step 2. B.S generates a random number ti for each attribute i ε universe of all the sensor attributes set I. Computes Ti = ti.G.
Step 3. Finally, the BS loads the following information into the memory of each cluster head CHu (u = 1, 2, . . ., m): a unique identifier CIDu, assigns a set of attributes Iu from global attribute set I. Assigns a master key MKCHu and a secret key Ku and Bu = bu.G (bu is known only to B.S ), a time stamp TCHu and its expiration time WCHu. B.S pre loads CIDu, EP(a,b), G, Iu, MKCHu, Bu, Ku, Tu, TCHu, WCHu.
Step 4. For each deployed sensor node Sj: The B.S assigns a unique identity SIDj and assigns a set of attributes Ij from global set I. Assigns a master key MKSj. B.S pre loads SIDj, Ij, MKSj for each sensor node.
B. Registration Phase
This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui registers with the base station for the first time.
Step 1. The user Ui selects the identifier IDi, a random number ri, and the password PWi. Ui then computes RPWi = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi). Ui provides the computed masked password RPWi and IDi to the base station via a secure channel for registration.
Step 2. On receiving the login request {RPWi, IDi} at time TSUi, the BS computes the following variables for Ui. Ai = h(IDi||TSUi), secret masked information Ri = h(RPWi||Ai). B.S also selects a secret key 'yi' for each user Ui and computes the Ui public key Yi = yi.G.
Step 3. The B.S selects an access structure Pi for each user Ui. After receiving the registration information from the valid users, the B.S assigns the access structure Pi for each Ui. These access structures are implemented through access tree. Every leaf nodes of the access tree is labeled with an attribute like 'Doctor' or 'Nurse' etc. The non-leaf nodes are reflected as a threshold gates. The access structures are symbolized using the logic expressions over the attributes. The privilege of user Ui is defined with the help of an access tree. For each node 'x' in Pi, the B.S needs to construct a dx+1 degree polynomial qx applying the Lagrange interpolation, where dx is the degree of the node 'x'.
Step 4. For each non-root node 'x' in Pi, it sets qx (0) = qparent(x) (index(x)), in which parent(x) is the parent of 'x' and index(x) denotes the index(x)-th child element of root node 'x'. The B.S then assigns qr(0) = y, where qr(0) is the polynomial of the root of the access tree of the user Ui. Finally the B.S computes Kiu = (qi(0)-ti) (mod p) for each leaf node i ε Pi.
Step 5. The BS then selects 'm' deployed cluster heads in the network CH1,CH2,…,CHm, which will be deployed during the initial deployment phase, and computes the m key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u <= m}, where Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)).
Step 6. For dynamic cluster head addition phase, the m' cluster heads, CHm+1, CHm+2, . . ., CHm+m', will be deployed later, after the initial deployment in the network, in order to replace some compromised cluster heads, if any, and add some fresh cluster heads along with sensor nodes. For this purpose, the BS assigns the unique identity CIDu * and unique master key MKCHu * . Similarly the B.S assigns the unique identity SIDj * , and unique master key MKSj * .
Step 7. Finally, the BS issues a tamper-proof smart card with the following parameters stored in it :(i)G (ii) TSUi (iii) Pi (iv)RUi (v) Kiu for each leaf node u ε Pi, (vi) Yi, (vii) h(.), and (viii) m+m' key-plus-id combinations {( Siu, CIDu) | 1<= u <= m+m'}. The value of m + m' is chosen according to memory availability of the smart card.
Step 8. On receiving the S.C from B.S, Ui inserts ri into its S.C.
C. Login Phase
Whenever the user Ui wants to access real-time data from a sensor of a deployed WSN, the user Ui needs to perform the following steps:
Step 1. Ui inserts his/her smart card into the card reader of a specific terminal and provides his/her Identity IDi, password PWi.
Step 2. The smart card then computes the masked password of the user Ui as RPWi * = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi), Ai * = h(IDi||TSUi), using the time stamp TSUi stored in Ui S.C. S.C further computes Ri * = h(RPWi * ||Ai * ), and then checks whether the computed Ri * equals to the Ri stored in the S.C. If this verification fails, it means Ui provided the incorrect credentials and terminates the session, else the smart card proceeds to perform the following steps.
Step 3. The S.C selects a session specific arbitrary number ni and computes Ni = ni.G. The S.C computes SKi = ni.Yi, Mi = h(Ri * || TUi|| Nix), where Nix is the x-co-ordinate of Ni, TUi is the current time stamp of Ui.
Step 4. The user Ui selects a cluster head, say CHu from which the real time data can be accessed inside WSN. Corresponding to CHu, the smart card computes Tiu = TUi⊕ Siu. Finally, the user Ui sends the message <Ni||ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi )> to the BS, via a public channel.
D. Authentication Phase
On receiving the login request message <Ni||ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu ||Mi )> from the user Ui, the BS performs the following steps in order to authenticate the user Ui.
Step 1. The BS computes SKi * = yi.Ni where 'yi' is a secret key assigned to Ui by B.S during registration phase. Using this computed key SKi * , the BS decrypts DSKix(ESKix (IDi|| CIDu||Tiu ||Mi ) to get {IDi, CIDu, Tiu, Mi}.
Step 2. The BS computes Siu * = h(TSUi||(TCHu⊕WCHu)), where TSUi is the time stamp at which the B.S received the Ui registration request, TCHu is the boot straped time stamp for CHu and WCHu is its validity. B.S retrives TUi * = Tiu ⊕ Siu * and computes Mi * = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix). B.S compares the computed Mi * with the received Mi. If both are equal, B.S confirms the authenticity of Ui.
Step 3. Using the current system time stamp TBS, the BS computes T1 = h(TUi * ||TBS) and produces a cipher text message, encrypted using the master key MKCHu of the cluster head CHu as EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||TBS|| Ni|| T1|| Yi||TSUi). The BS directs the message <EMKCHu(IDi|| CIDu||Tiu||TBS||Ni|| T1|| Yi||TSUi)> to the corresponding cluster head CHu.
Step 4. After receiving the message in Step3 from the BS, the cluster head CHu decrypts EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi) using its own master key MKCHu as DMKCHu[EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)]= (IDi|| CIDu|| Tiu|| TBS|| Ni|| T1|| Yi|| TSUi). CHu then checks if retrieved CIDu is equal to its identity i.e CIDu. If both are equal, CHu further checks if |TBS-TBS * | < ∆T, where TBS * is the received system time stamp of the CHu and ∆T is the allowed valid transmission delay. If it holds good, CHu computes Siu * = h(TSUi|| (TCHu⊕WCHu)) using its boot straped TCHu and its expiration time WCHu. CHu proceeds to compute TUi * = Tiu ⊕ TCHu, using the retrieved TUi * , CHu computes T1 * = h(TUi * ||TBS). If the computed T1 * equals the received T1, CHu authenticates B.S. Finally, CHu performs master key encryption phase which forwards the login reply message to Ui. Ui performs the data decryption phase in respond to master encryption phase.
E. Master Key Encryption Phase
In this phase, any user CHu performs the following steps:
Step 1. CHu computes K3 = (Bu + Y) (mod p), based on the stored values of Bu and Y. CHu further computes K2u = (Bu + Tu) for all the attributes u, where u ε Iu for that cluster head CHu.
Step 2. As per the user Ui request, the cluster head CHu computes Kiu = h(CIDu||IDi|| TUi * || Nix||TCHu), Ksi = h(Kiu|| K3). CHu encrypts the sensor data M using Ksi i.e M1 = EKsi(M).
Step 3. CHu forwards the authentication reply message <M1||TSCHu||( TCHu⊕WCHu)|| TCHu||h(IDi||CIDu|| TSCHu|| M1)|| K2u for all u ε Iu > to Ui, where TSCHu is the current time stamp of CHu.
F. Data Decryption Phase
Step1. On receiving the message from the cluster head CHu, during the master key and data encryption phase, the user Ui, computes a hash value h(IDi||CIDu||TSCHu|| M1) based on the received values of TSCHu, M1. If the computed hash value equals the received hash value, Ui proceeds further, else terminates the session. Ui further compares |TSCHu * -TSCHu| < ∆T, if it is valid, Ui further computes WCHu from TCHu⊕WCHu and validates the expiration time i.e WCHu >= TCHu. If the condition is valid, Ui authenticates CHu else terminates the connection.
Step 2. On successful authentication of CHu, Ui starts the decrypts process from leaf nodes of its own access tree, in a bottom to top up approach. Ui computes Fa for each leaf node 'l' in Pi using the following logic: if 'a' ε Iu, the Fa = Access (KuUi+ K2u) else Fa = ǂ (invalid). For the user Ui, the access tree is Pi for which the root node is 'r'. If Pix is the sub-tree of Pi, Pix is rooted at node x. If a set of attributes Iu satisfies the access tree Pix, then only we obtain Access (KuUi * g + K2i) = (y+bi)g (mod p), which is shown in the following steps: Access(KuUi+ K2u) = ((qx(0)-ti)g+(Bi+Ti)) (mod p) = (qr(0)-ti)g+(bi+ti)g) (mod p) = (y+bi)g (mod p) = (yg+big) (mod p) = K3 * where qx(0) = qparent(x) (index(x)) , qr (0) = y and qx (0) = qparent(x) (index(x)), is executed in a recursive way as discussed in [12] .
Step 3. The user Ui computes Kiu = h(CIDu||IDi||TUi|| Nix|| TSCHu) and Ksi = h(Kiu||K3 * )) and then uses the key Ksi to decrypt DKsi(M1) = DKsi(EKsi(M)) = M.
III.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SANTANU ET AL SCHEME
In this segment, we will cryptanalyze the Santanu et al [10] scheme and illustrate that Santanu et al scheme is vulnerable to privileged insider attacker, node capture attack. Also we will illustrate that Santanu et al scheme consists of few anomalies or inconsistencies which restricts the protocol flow.
Attack Model: 1) An opponent or an attacker or legal user can extract the information cached in the smart card by several techniques such as power consumption or leaked information [10] etc. i.e S.C = {:(i) G (ii) TSUj (iii) Pj (iv) RUi (v) Kiu for each leaf node u ε Pi, (vi) Yi, (vii) h(.), and (viii) m+m' key-plus-id combinations {( Siu, CIDu) | 1<= u <= m+m'}, ri } .
2) An opponent can passive monitor or eavesdrop or alter or replay the login request, login reply messages communicated among Ui, B.S, CH over a public channel which is Internet. i.e {{Ni||ESKix(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||Mi}, { EMKCHu(IDi|| CIDu||Tiu||TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)}, {<M1|| TSCHu || (TCHu ⊕WCHu)|| TCHu||h(IDi|| CIDu||TSCHu|| M1) || K2u for all u ε Iu >}}
A. Huge Data Storage and Computation Requirement for
Generating User Smart Card In Santanu et al. scheme the user smart card memory is stored with 'm' key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u <= m}, where Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)) of all cluster heads in the WSN. Based on the Santanu et al. discussion, for a total of 20,000 sensor nodes to be deployed and if each cluster head can handle 200 sensor nodes, then there are total m = 100 cluster heads needed and for dynamic cluster head addition m' =100 cluster heads are reserved. So a total of m+m' = 100+100 (Siu, CIDu) details are stored. A total of 200 hash operations need to be performed for each user smart card. If the system contains 'n' users, then a total of (n * 200) hash operations need to be performed to load the smart card memory of corresponding user which requires huge computation cost from the BS. The major issue is that, the user may not interested or in need of data from all the cluster heads. Hence storing all the m+m' cluster head details is a major drawback in Santanu et al scheme.
Suppose, if any cluster head CHu * is found to be compromised, the B.S re assigns the master key MKCHu * , identity CIDu * , set of identities Iu * , Bu * = bu.G (bu is known only to B.S), a time stamp TCHu * and its expiration time WCHu * . Apart from re assigning the values of compromised CHu * , the S.C values of all the users whose key-plus-Id combination contains CHu must be modified, which requires huge computation cost.
B. Fails to Resists Privileged Insider Attack
As demonstrated by A.K Das et al in their recent work [1] , (one of the authors of the Santanu et al [10] scheme), performed an insider attack, we will apply same strategy on Santanu et al scheme, which is described as follows:
Step 1. Assume that the privileged insider 'E' stolen or gets the smart card of Ui for a while, then, 'E' can launch offline password guessing attack as follows:
Step2. As discussed in 2.3, during registration phase of Ui, Ui submits the login request {RPWi, IDi} where RPWi = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi). From the login request 'E' intercepts IDi, from the stolen smart card of Ui, 'E' can get ri. Now from the intercepted value of RPWi = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi), 'E' can perform guessing attack [1] on Ui password from a moderately small dictionary, over the subsequent steps.
Step 2.1). Choose a guessed password PWi to be PWi * . Hence, in Santanu et al scheme, the insider on getting the stolen S.C of Ui can compute the Ui password.
Step 2.2). Compute RPWi

C. Fails to Resists Node Capture Attack
A sensor node capture attack is a WSN specific physical type of attack. As the sensor nodes and cluster heads are not equipped with tamper resistant hardware, the attacker can capture a legitimate sensor node or cluster head in WSN and can extract the secret information stored in it. Each cluster head and sensor node is pre-loaded with the master keys i.e MKCHu and M.K.Sj respectively. On receiving the login request <Ni||ESKix (IDi|| CIDu || Tiu|| Mi )> from Ui, the base station computes and forwards a message to the corresponding cluster head CHu which is encrypted with its master key i.e <EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)>. If an attacker captures the cluster head CHu can retrieve its master key MKCHu which is stored in its hardware, as discussed above, an attacker 'E' can capture all the communications between the protocol entities, hence, 'E' can capture the message sent by B.S to CHu and can decrypt it to get DMKCHu(EMKCHu(IDi|| CIDu|| Tiu|| TBS||Ni|| T1||Yi||TSUi)) = {IDi, CIDu,Tiu, TBS, Ni, T1, Yi, TSUi} which involves the identity of the logged in user i.e IDi. Therefore, we can conclude that, in Santanu et al scheme, if an attacker captures a cluster head, he can extract the secret key stored in it and can decrypt the messages forwarded to the cluster head to get the identity of the user logged in. Hence, we can conclude that Santanu et al scheme fails to resist identity leakage attack.
IV. ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES IN SANTANU ET AL
SCHEME
In this section, we discuss few anomalies or inconsistencies found in Santanu et al [10] scheme.
A. Inconsistencies in Registration Phase:
In Santanu et al scheme, during registration phase, the Base Station B.S computes the variables Ai = h(IDi||TSUi), Ri = h(RPWi||Ai) where TSUi is the time at which the B.S received the registration request from Ui. B.S also selects a secret key yi for Ui and computes the Ui public key Yi = yi.G.
1) Inconsistency 1:
In Santanu et al scheme, the authors didn't mentioned clearly on how the base station stores the value 'Ri' and the secret key 'yi' assigned to each user in its database, to use these values in authentication phase.
B. Inconsistencies in Authentication Phase:
In this section, we discuss the inconsistencies found in authentication phase of Santanu et al scheme.
1) Inconsistency 1:
In Santanu et al scheme, during the registration phase, S.C submits the login request message <Ni||ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi )> to the BS, in which Ni = ni.G, where 'ni' is an arbitrary number chosen by S.C specific to the current login request. SKi = ni.Yi, where Yi = yi.G is the Ui public key computed out of a secret key 'yi' assigned to Ui by the B.S. SKix is the x-co-ordinate of SKi.
On receiving the login request from Ui, B.S proceeds to compute SKi = yi.Ni. To compute SKi, B.S needs 'yi', which is secret key of Ui assigned by B.S. The login request contains two parts Ni, which is a random one and doesn't contains any clue about the user identity. The second part of login request ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi) is encrypted using SKix, which is also a random value and doesn't contain any clue about the user details. Therefore it is impossible for a B.S to identify from which user, it got the login request. Hence, it is impossible to retrieve 'yi' a user specific value to compute SKi.
2) Inconsistency 2
In Santanu et al scheme, as discussed in section 2.5 (authentication phase), step 2, the B.S computes Mi * = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix). To compute Mi * , B.S requires the value 'Ri'. In Santanu et al scheme, the B.S is computing 'Ri' during Ui registration phase, but as discussed in 4.1.2, it is not clear in which format, the B.S stores Ri in its data base. One option for B.S is to compute Ri i.e Ri * = h(RPWi * ||Ai * ) where Ai * = h(IDi||TSUi), RPWi = h(IDi || ri ||PWi). B.S doesn't know Ui password PWi, identity IDi, random number chosen by Ui i.e ri. Hence, it is impossible to compute Ri * by B.S. In summary, B.S is not storing Ri * and doesn't have the required parameters to compute Ri * . Therefore, computing Mi * = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix) is impossible for B.S.
V. CONCLUSION
Recently Santanu et al. proposed an ECC-based user access control scheme with attribute-based encryption for WSN. Even though it is a novel attempt, after thorough analysis of Santanu et al paper, we demonstrated that their scheme is vulnerable to privilege insider attack and node capture attack. We also established that Santanu et al scheme include major inconsistencies which oppose the correct protocol execution. In future work, we aim to propose a secure and light weight authentication scheme for WSN by eliminating the security pitfalls and inconsistencies found in Santanu et al scheme.
